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The contemporary multilateral trading system comprises members ranging from high- 
to very low-income countries; this range has a bearing on the operations of the 
multilateral trade regime. Presence of a large number of low-income members is the 
new systemic reality. Special and differential treatment (SDT) has operated for the 
developing economies, principally for the small, low-income ones, for many decades. 
The concept of SDT grew in three basic stages, on which this article elaborates. 
Theoretically this concept was meaningful and significant, but in reality it has not 
engendered substantial benefits to the intended beneficiary groups, the developing 
economies. The Uruguay and the Doha Rounds of multilateral trade negotiations 
(MTNs) reaffirmed faith in SDT. The Doha Development Agenda (DDA) was clear 
about reaffirming the importance of SDT to the multilateral trade regime and referred 
to it as an integral part of the WTO Agreement. During the Fifth Ministerial 
Conference in Cancún and the subsequent WTO meeting in Geneva in July 2004, small 
developing countries held together as the Group-of-Ninety (G-90). They made their 
presence felt in the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference as well. As SDT has not 
spawned large benefits for the target groups of countries, there is a pressing need to 
refine the concept. Academics and policy makers have debated over what future shape 
SDT should take so that it will be able to meet the expected goals. Taking these 
concerns into account, this article presents a comprehensive set of recommendations.  
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Patience and perseverance have a magical effect before which difficulties 
disappear and obstacles vanish.  
—John Quincy Adams 
1. Introduction 
his article dwells on the diversity-driven special treatment of the developing 
economies in the multilateral trade regime. The concept of “special and 
differential treatment” (SDT) materialized early during the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) period. During the lifetime of the GATT the concept of SDT 
developed in several stages. Developing countries were given non-reciprocal 
preferences under SDT by the industrial economies. Being on the lower rungs of the 
economic ladder, they also need some policy space. This consideration has been a part 
of the multilateral trading system for decades. Whether the target economies have 
benefited from the SDT, and if they have by how much, remains open to debate. The 
developing economies have used SDT for inter alia securing preferential access to the 
markets of the industrial countries. SDT has taken varying forms and been related to 
different trade issues. Numerous categories of preferential market access schedules 
have been given to developing countries under different agreements and 
arrangements. In recent years SDT has intensified for low-income developing 
countries, and the least-developed countries (LDCs)
1 were granted preferential market 
access by the industrial economies under the Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP), a large category of market-access schedules. The Doha Development Agenda 
(DDA) had definite objectives in this area, and the possible new shape of SDT was 
deliberated during the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations at length before 
its collapse, which followed a prolonged stagnation.    
Section 2 of this article traces the concept of SDT and its intellectual origins, 
while section 3 focuses on various beneficiary-country groups. The issue of 
hierarchies of beneficiaries is the focus of section 4. What sort of new shape SDT is 
likely to take under the Doha Round is analyzed in section 5. Many small and low-
income developing countries are concerned that trade liberalization under the Doha 
Round will erode their preferences. Section 6 analyses whether this apprehension is 
justified. Section 7 concludes and summarizes. 
2. Special and Differential Treatment  
he members of the WTO range from very high-income to very low-income 
countries. In terms of stages of growth, institutional development, resources and 
capacity constraints they cover a large spectrum. The WTO does not have a definition 
T 
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of developing economies, although some supranational institutions, for example the 
World Bank, provide closely worded definitions not only of developing economies but 
also of various subgroups among them. In the case of the WTO, it is the member that 
decides and announces its status itself; that is, members declare whether they are 
“developed” or “developing” countries. However, other members can challenge the 
decision of a member to make use of provisions available to developing countries. 
Due to the fact that members represent a wide diversity in economic and institutional 
resources, their ability and willingness to incur costs associated with implementation 
of new multilateral trade rules varies significantly. So does their ability to derive 
benefit from such rules. The implementation and adjustment costs associated with new 
regulations are almost always borne by the developing economies, because these rules 
essentially represent the status quo in the mature industrial economies and are passed 
on to the developing economies as the best practices.    
Over the decades, the traditional approach in the multilateral trade system for the 
developing economies has been to seek benefits under SDT. This was a part of the 
process of evolution of the multilateral trade regime. It goes back to the period when 
negotiations for the International Trade Organization (ITO) were going on in 1946 and 
1947 (Narlikar, 2006). What does the term SDT precisely entail? It captures the 
GATT/WTO provisions that (i) allow high-income countries to grant preferential 
access to their markets to some developing economies, (ii) allow the developing 
economies the right to limit reciprocity in multilateral trade negotiations (MTNs) to 
levels “consistent with development needs”, (iii) give them exemption from some 
WTO obligations, many of which are transitory and some permanent, (iv) give them 
extra time periods to comply with obligations, (v) allow developing economies greater 
freedom to use otherwise restricted trade policies and (vi) provide technical assistance 
and help in institution building so that WTO obligations can be fulfilled and 
negotiated decisions implemented. The basic philosophical premise behind the 
provisions of SDT is simple and logical: the developing economies are provided SDT 
on the premise that their industrial development depends on assistance for some time 
in both their home markets (by way of protection) and in their export markets (by way 
of preferences in the form of lower tariffs and fewer non-tariff barriers).  
2.1 Intellectual Foundation of Special and Differential 
Treatment  
SDT is an obvious departure from the all-important most-favoured nation (MFN) 
principle of the GATT/WTO. The history of SDT is as old as the GATT/WTO system 
itself. Not only has it existed since the inception of the GATT, it also had a significant 
history in the multilateral trading system. Raul Prebisch and Hans Singer were the   Dilip K. Das 
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intellectual fathers of the concept. They argued that during the 1950s and 1960s the 
exports of the developing economies were concentrated in the area of primary 
products and commodities, which were characterized by volatile prices and steadily 
deteriorating terms of trade. Therefore, they (along with Ragnar Nurkse) propounded 
the strategy of import-substituting industrialization (ISI), supported by high rates of 
protection for the infant domestic industries in the developing economies. The 
rationale that infant industries needed protection from international competition is 
reflected in the “policy space” argument, which posits leeway in the implementation 
of WTO for the developing economies. Although the infant industry argument is 
accepted by economic theory, this group of economic theorists applied it a little too 
comprehensively and indiscriminately. Consequently, in the economies that followed 
the ISI strategy, the infant industries remained infants for decades – until many of 
them touched their middle ages. South Asian and Latin American economies avidly 
followed the ISI strategy in the 1950s and beyond. The second premise behind SDT 
was that trade liberalization under the MFN clause was not enough for the small and 
low-income developing countries to be able to expand their trade and thereby 
accelerate their growth rates. These low-income economies needed preferential market 
access in the industrial countries’ markets through instruments like SDT. To that end, 
various programs under the auspices of the GSP were considered necessary.  
In international fora such as the United Nations General Assembly and 
subsequently in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) the developing economies lobbied for equitable outcomes in the GATT 
system, rather than merely equitable processes, so that preferential treatment could be 
institutionalized for them. As the GATT did not have institutional mechanisms like 
majority voting and coalition building, these efforts had to take place outside the 
GATT. These lobbying efforts achieved some measure of success in the form of 
Article XVIII of the GATT-1947.
2 In the initial stages SDT was limited to the 
provisions of Article XVIII, which both allowed developing economies to void or 
renegotiate their commitments and limited infant industry protection. A modification 
that took place in 1954-55 was inclusion of Article XVIIIb, which allowed the 
developing countries use of quantitative restrictions (QRs) for balance-of-payments 
reasons.     
Developing economies continued their endeavours to have the objective of growth 
and development included in the agenda of the supranational institutions. The 1960s 
was designated as the UN Development Decade. This turned out to be a fruitful period 
for the developing economies, during which they achieved more successes. The 
second defining moment in the development of the concept of SDT came during the 
Kennedy Round (1962-67), when Part IV on the benefits to and obligations of the   Dilip K. Das 
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developing economies was introduced in the Articles of Agreements of the GATT-
1947. Added in 1965, Part IV of the GATT was devoted to trade and development. It 
provided for discriminatory “advantages” for developing countries during the MTNs. 
The Committee on Trade and Development (CTD) was established. It is noteworthy 
that much of the language of Part IV suggested good intentions rather than 
obligations. The developing economies were explicitly relieved of any requirement to 
reciprocate the benefits provided by the industrial economies. Recognition of the 
principle of non-reciprocity by the industrial economies was an unprecedented 
measure. Article XXXVI of Part IV acknowledged the wide income disparities 
between the developing and industrial economies and emphasized the need for rapid 
economic advancement in the developing economies by means of “a rapid and 
sustained expansion of the export earnings of the less-developed contracting parties.” 
In 1971, a waiver was adopted to temporarily legitimize the GSP under the GATT 
system. These were significant epistemic and institutional developments, and for the 
first time the developing economies were able to introduce a concept of fairness in the 
GATT system.    
2.2 Enabling Clause  
The third important period in the life of SDT came during the Tokyo Round (1973-
79). What SDT entails was further clarified and made a formal element of the 
multilateral trading system in 1979, when the Enabling Clause was introduced. It 
established that the developing economies were exempted from Article I, the MFN 
clause of the GATT-1947.
3 The Enabling Clause legally established the principle of 
non-reciprocity in trade negotiations, in turn facilitating more favourable treatment 
and preferential market access for the developing countries in the mature industrial 
economies. In negotiations in different rounds of MTNs, reciprocity for them was 
limited to levels “consistent with development needs”, as specified in the Enabling 
Clause. In addition, they were provided with greater freedom to use trade policies than 
the GATT rules otherwise permitted. SDT also entailed the cost of implementation of 
WTO agreements. The Enabling Clause effectively made GSP a permanent feature of 
the multilateral trade regime and further extended discriminatory preferences to the 
UN-designated LDCs group. 
The Enabling Clause had a “graduation principle” associated with it. This was an 
important qualification, which made it clear that the developing countries enjoying the 
benefits of GSP are to go off the GSP list when they move up the ladder of economic 
growth. The Enabling Clause was to be understood as an impermanent measure 
devised for a specific objective. Its graduation principle clearly implied that the 
developing economies are to assume their normal reciprocity in multilateral trade   Dilip K. Das 
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liberalization when the time comes to do so. The MFN and reciprocity were the 
fundamental principles of the GATT; their waivers were granted only to support the 
economic growth process.   
Thus, development objectives were covered by Article XVIII of the GATT-1947 
and, subsequently, the GATT-1994. Conceived in a considerate manner, Article XVIII 
not only permits the developing economies to use their trade policies in pursuit of 
economic development and industrialization, but also imposes a weaker discipline on 
them than on the industrial economies in several areas of GATT/WTO regulations. It 
also exhorts the industrialized countries to take into account the interests of the 
developing economies in the application of GATT disciplines. The Enabling Clause 
made SDT an essential element of the GATT system and disciplines. With prescience, 
the Enabling Clause also required that, as economic development gathers momentum, 
the developing economies would try to improve their capacity to gradually reciprocate 
concessions. This was christened the process of “graduation”. Subsequently, several 
preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have been created under the Enabling Clause.
4  
2.3 Discriminatory System of Preferential Market Access 
The SDT is a system of preferences; it is, by definition, discriminatory. Historically, 
efforts to operationalize SDT essentially centred on preferential market access through 
the GSP. To this end, there has been a long-standing trend of unilateral discriminatory 
liberalization, which was operationalized through offering tariff- and quota-free 
market access for the small and low-income developing economies, particularly the 
LDCs. This group comprises economically vulnerable countries. If fully implemented, 
the discriminatory liberalization schemes could certainly make SDT more effective 
than it has been in the past.  
Unilateral market access could not be offered to the developing economies that do 
not fall under the LDC category, because to do so would be a political impossibility in 
the industrial economies.
5 Therefore, the absolute poor of the global economy cannot 
benefit from SDT because a large proportion of them live in South Asia and Sub-
Saharan Africa. While all of these economies come under the category of developing 
economies, not all of them are LDCs. This means that the absolute poor can only 
benefit if trade liberalization proceeds multilaterally, in a non-discriminatory manner. 
3. Beneficiaries of Special and Different Treatment    
ver time, non-reciprocal trade preferences became a part of the relationship 
between the developing and industrial economies in the multilateral trade 
regime. The SDT principle has operated for the developing economies, principally for 
the small and low-income ones, for many decades. In the recent period such 
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preferences have deepened, particularly for the LDCs and the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) economies. Noteworthy among the SDT schedules are the Everything-
But-Arms (EBA) initiative by the European Union and the parallel U.S. initiative, the 
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). The SDT schedules usually exempt 
certain products from tariffs. Exports of bananas, rice and sugar are not covered under 
the EBA. As many as 144 developing countries and customs territories presently 
benefit from the GSP schedules of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries (IMF, 2006).  
Theoretically this concept is meaningful and significant, but in reality it has not 
engendered substantial benefits for the intended beneficiaries. There are several 
reasons for this failure. The preferential market access schedules under SDT were 
designed voluntarily by the industrial economies, which chose both the eligible 
countries and the products for their respective schedules. It has been observed that, 
first, the selected countries and products generally lacked capacity to export and, 
second, countries and products with export potential were excluded from the 
schedules. Third, when the market preferences were granted, the preference schedules 
were laden with restrictions, product exclusions and administrative rules in the form 
of documentary requirements.  
Schemes like the EBA and AGOA could potentially have a good deal of 
favourable impact on exports from the beneficiary economies, but those benefits 
depend primarily upon the supply-side capabilities in these economies. Supply-side 
constraints have seriously limited potential use of SDT schedules. Second, 
documentary requirements by the preference-granting countries for ascertaining the 
origin of exports, or the so-called rules of origin (ROO) requirements, tend to work as 
a real administrative barrier and reduce the utilization rate of the GSP schedules. This 
applies particularly to some of the large export sectors, such as textiles and apparel. 
Third, most LDCs have failed to benefit from the GSP schedules because of costs and 
uncertainties created by product exclusion (Brenton, 2003). Fourth, the strategy of 
granting non-reciprocal market access to LDCs under various GSP schedules has not 
turned out to be effective. Preferences are not enforceable commitments under the 
WTO. Consequently, many of these schedules have worked merely as exhortations. 
They did not go beyond “best endeavor” promises that were subjected to numerous 
restrictions.  
Fifth, overall coverage of these schedules applied to only a tiny portion of exports 
of small and low-income developing economies. Experiences under various GSP 
schedules reveal that the eligible countries are able to utilize only a small part of the 
preference granted to them. Their utilization rate is quantified. The exports of eligible 
countries under various preferential schemes form a very small part of EU and U.S.   Dilip K. Das 
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imports. Over the past three decades they have ranged between 0.9 percent and 0.4 
percent of total annual imports of the EU and the United States (WB, 2004). Sixth, the 
preference schedules are characterized by trade diversion; that is, they divert trade 
with the ineligible developing countries. Finally, preferential market access schedules 
do not benefit the target groups of population referred to as the absolute poor of the 
world.
6  
While there are a large number of eligible recipients of the benefits of SDT, not all 
of them have benefited. Numerous studies have shown that while some developing 
economies have benefited from non-reciprocal preferences to a significant degree, 
others have not benefited at all (Ozden and Reinhardt, 2003; Grossman and Sykes, 
2005). With regard to which developing economies have benefited, the foremost 
group is a small subset of relatively more advanced developing economies of Asia, 
which have gradually acquired the status of emerging-market economies (EMEs). The 
supply-side scenario in this small group is better developed than in the other small, 
low-income developing economies. Also, they put to good use the export revenues 
generated. This group not only has the wherewithal to export the products but also 
efficiently meets the administrative requirements – preparation of documents required 
by the preference-granting countries. This subset of economies has not allowed ROO 
to become an effective barrier. It was observed that liberal ROO were a critical factor 
for eliciting a strong response from the potential beneficiary economies, particularly 
in products like textiles and apparel.
7  
According to statistics compiled by the World Bank (2004), in 2001 130 countries 
were eligible for SDT. According to the International Monetary Fund this number was 
144 in 2006 (IMF, 2006). Of these, 10 countries accounted for 77 percent of U.S. non-
oil imports under its GSP. The same 10 countries accounted for 49 percent of all GSP 
imports to all the industrial countries that were providing GSP. Occasionally a small 
developing country did benefit substantially from preferential market access where 
domestic prices were raised above the world market prices by tariffs, subsidies or 
other trade-distorting mechanisms. For instance, Mauritius, which exports sugar and 
enjoys preferential access to the EU markets, benefited a good deal from this 
opportunity. However, these benefits to Mauritius came at a high cost to the EU 
taxpayers and consumers (WB, 2004).           
A comparison of beneficiary countries that were eligible for the U.S. GSP and 
those that were recently graduated from it revealed that the latter category 
outperformed the former in terms of export performance. Countries that were no 
longer on the GSP eligibility list had higher export-to-GDP ratios, as well as higher 
export growth rates in real terms. One explanation for the success of the countries that 
graduated from the U.S. GSP-eligible list that seems rational is that it appears that the   Dilip K. Das 
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GSP provided a stimulus to their export industries. While care must be taken in 
attributing causality, GSP seemingly helped the graduating countries to engender 
supply-side capabilities, which strengthened with the passage of time and turned these 
small developing economies into successful trading economies. The flip side of the 
coin is that mere GSP eligibility cannot turn them into successful exporters. Reform of 
their macroeconomic policy structures must have played a decisive role.  
4. Hierarchies of Beneficiaries and Preferential Market 
Access    
n the hierarchy of beneficiaries from preferential market access, the most preferred 
countries are those that are part of a regional integration agreement (RIA) with the 
preference-granting economy. Trade partners in an RIA commonly have close trade 
and economic ties. This trade relationship is usually reciprocal in nature. The LDCs, 
which enjoy unilateral preferences or free market access, come next in terms of 
importance. Other small developing economies with which the preference-granting 
economies have a GSP relationship are the last. GSPs are unilateral in nature and are 
devised for large country groups of beneficiaries.  
Several unilateral preferential market access programs were devised as GSPs by 
the industrial economies as well laid out, structured and customized programs that 
were intended to be carefully implemented. Each one of them had characteristic 
features regarding eligibility criteria, product coverage and administrative rules in 
important areas such as ROO. Together these criteria determine which developing 
countries are excluded and which can benefit from the customized unilateral 
preferential market access schedule. The programs devised and implemented by the 
United States include the AGOA, the Caribbean Basin Initiative and the Andean Trade 
Promotion Act, as well as several unilateral and reciprocal trade agreements with 
Israel and Jordan. The principal EU programs include the Cotonou Convention, which 
includes the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, and the EBA initiative 
targeting the LDCs. The EU has also entered into a large number of unilateral and 
reciprocal trade agreements with the North African, Middle Eastern and 
Mediterranean economies.
8          
The characteristic features of unilateral and reciprocal trade agreements differ 
from GSP schemes in several important respects. For instance, some sectors (such as 
textiles and apparel, processed foods, etc.) are treated as “sensitive” items and usually 
excluded from the GSP. These sensitive sectors of trade are included in some 
unilateral and reciprocal trade agreements. For instance, by 2009, the EBA initiative 
will cover all the exports of the target group of countries. All protectionist measures 
will be eliminated for imports into the EU economies from the 50 LDCs. However, an 
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unseen restriction in this is that the products that matter most to LDCs (rice, sugar and 
bananas) were not to be liberalized until after 2006. Their liberalization begins in 2007 
and will become complete in 2009.  Second, under the unilateral and reciprocal trade 
agreements, administrative requirements tend to be more relaxed in comparison to the 
more comprehensive GSP schemes, particularly regarding the ROO.  
Despite recent improvements in the implementation of these programs, as 
mentioned earlier the overall imports into the industrial economies under various 
preferential schemes have remained diminutive, almost insignificant. (The textile and 
apparel exports from small African economies that came under the AGOA to the 
United States represent an exception; these exports recorded significant gains.) In 
2001, imports by the Quadrilateral (or Quad) countries
9 from the GSP-beneficiary 
economies amounted to $588 billion, of which $298 billion were subject to normal 
trade and non-trade restrictions while $184 billion came under various preferential 
trade programs. That is, the coverage of these programs was 38.9 percent of the 
eligible exports, which in turn received market access preference. In 1991, this 
proportion was 51.1 percent. Thus the proportion of coverage of eligible exports 
declined during the decade of the 1990s (Inama, 2003). A similar quantitative study by 
Haveman and Shatz (2003) produced comparable, although slightly different, 
evidence of coverage. 
5. Special and Differential Treatment in the Doha 
Round 
ubsequent rounds of MTNs (the Uruguay and Doha Rounds) have reaffirmed 
faith in SDT. The DDA was clear about reaffirming the importance of SDT to the 
multilateral trade regime and referred to it in the Doha Communiqué as “an integral 
part of the WTO agreement” (paragraph 44). SDT figures in several places in the 
Doha Communiqué. The objective of the DDA in this area is clearly laid down in 
paragraph 2 of the Communiqué as “… we shall continue to make positive efforts 
designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least-developed 
among them, secure a share in the growth of world trade commensurate with the needs 
of their economic development. In this context, enhanced market access, balanced 
rules, and well targeted, sustainably financed technical assistance and capacity-
building programmes have important roles to play” (WTO, 2001).  
Recognizing that SDT had not succeeded in imparting large benefits to the target 
group of beneficiaries, participating members called, in paragraph 44, for a review of 
the SDT schedules so that their provisions could be strengthened, “making them more 
precise, effective and operational” and enabling SDT to fulfill its objectives (WTO, 
2001). As the benefits of SDT were to be provided through enhanced market access, 
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balanced rules, and well targeted, sustainably financed technical assistance, a good 
case exists for rethinking all three channels so the benefits can be more precisely 
targeted for the groups that need them most. Affirming the good intentions of the 
negotiators, the Doha Communiqué provided (in paragraph 14) a deadline of March 
2003 for reestablishing the new modalities of SDT. The deliberations and dialogues on 
this issue continued all through 2002 and 2003.  
Notwithstanding the upbeat commitments expressed in firm language in the Doha 
Communiqué, during these deliberations WTO members not only were deeply divided 
on important SDT matters, but also had opinions that were significantly far apart from 
each other. They could not approach a consensus or an agreement of any kind. The 
deep division among WTO members on the scope and design of SDT was indubitably 
a reflection of their wide diversity in terms of income levels, stages of growth, 
capacity and institutional constraints, national policies and investment priorities. The 
foregoing sections have pointed to differences in each member’s ability and 
willingness to bear the burden of cost associated with implementation of WTO rules, 
as well as the payoffs they are likely to receive from these rules.    
5.1. Official Commitments to Special and Differential 
Treatment 
After the failure of the Fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancún, the so-called July 
Framework Agreement was arrived at during the last day of July 2004. In this 
agreement the General Council of the WTO reaffirmed that provisions for SDT are an 
integral part of the WTO agreements. The council not only reaffirmed the DDA 
objective of strengthening them, but also recommended making them more “precise, 
effective and operational”. The Committee on Trade and Development (CTD) began a 
review of SDT. The council instructed the CTD to expeditiously complete the review 
of all the outstanding agreement-specific proposals regarding SDT and report to the 
General Council, with clear recommendations for a decision, by July 2005. The CTD, 
within the parameters of the Doha mandate, was asked to address all other outstanding 
work, including on the cross-cutting issues, the monitoring mechanism and the 
incorporation of SDT into the architecture of WTO rules. However, the CTD after 
several meetings failed to make concrete recommendations to the General Council. 
Members continued to have strong and fundamental disagreements on several issues.  
The General Council reviewed and recognized the progress that has been made 
since the beginning of the negotiations of the Doha Ministerial Conference in 
expanding trade-related technical assistance (TRTA) to small and low-income 
developing countries and economies in transition. In furthering this effort the council 
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enhanced TRTA and capacity-building assistance to increase their effective 
participation in the negotiations, to facilitate their implementation of WTO rules and 
to enable them to adjust and diversify their economies. In this context the council 
welcomed and further encouraged improved coordination with other agencies, 
including under the Integrated Framework (IF) for TRTA for the LDCs and the Joint 
Integrated Technical Assistance Program (JITAP) (WTO, 2004). This did give an 
impression that SDT is being taken up for serious review and at the end of the Doha 
Round should emerge stronger than ever.  
The Hong Kong Declaration of December 18, 2005, once again reaffirmed that 
the provisions for SDT are an integral part of the WTO agreements (WTO, 2005). In 
paragraphs 35 through 38 of the Hong Kong Ministerial Communiqué members 
expressed their determination to fulfill the DDA mandate spelled out in paragraph 44 
of the Doha Ministerial Declaration as well as in the July Framework Agreement, that 
all SDT provisions would be reviewed with a view to “strengthening them and making 
them more precise, effective and operational”. Official recognition was given to “lack 
of progress” in the Hong Kong Declaration; accordingly, the CTD was again 
instructed to “expeditiously complete the review of all outstanding agreement-specific 
proposals and report to the General Council, with clear recommendations for 
decision”, this time by December 2006.     
5.2 Refining and Strengthening the Concept of Special and 
Differential Treatment  
In view of the fact that SDT has not spawned large benefits for the target groups, 
academics and policy makers have debated over what future shape SDT should take 
so that it will be able to meet the expected goals.
10 In their various official 
pronouncements, the ongoing Doha Round negotiations have given additional 
importance to this debate, because this is inter alia being seen as an opportunity to 
refine the SDT system. As alluded to above, while WTO members have found 
agreement on SDT elusive, there is some degree of agreement among analysts and 
researchers on the new shape of SDT. Their recommendations are thoughtful and 
comprehensive and are summarized as follows. First, a bold unilateral measure such 
as a general reduction by 2010 in all MFN tariffs in the industrial economies to 5 
percent on labour-intensive exports from the small and low-income developing 
economies, and to 10 percent on their agricultural exports, will indeed reduce 
impediments such as the ROO-related documentation requirements. The target date 
for achieving Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is 2015. By this time all tariffs 
on exports of manufactured products from the developing economies should be 
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Second, as with the first recommendation, industrial economies need to 
unilaterally expand market access for LDCs and simplify the ROO requirements. This 
will circumvent some of the problems presently related to the GSP schedules.  
Third, in keeping with the spirit of the first and the second recommendations, 
developing economies, on their part, should slash their tariff barriers on the basis of an 
agreed formula-based approach. Such action would amount to their reciprocation to 
the measures taken by the industrial economies. It will help in keeping the multilateral 
trade regime balanced.   
Fourth, paragraph 2 (d) of Article I of the GATS refers to international trade in the 
supply of services through the presence of natural persons in a foreign country when 
both the country of origin and the recipient country are members of the GATS. Such 
provision of services is known as Mode-4. Industrial economies should make binding 
commitments to expand temporary access of service providers by a specific 
proportion of the workforce, say, 1 percent. Judged by the present level of temporary 
access, this indeed is a large measure and will realistically take some time to 
implement in a phased manner without disturbing the domestic economies in the 
industrial countries.  
Fifth, acceptance of the principle of policy space for the small and low-income 
developing economies under WTO discipline would go a long way in helping many of 
these economies. They may be permitted to decide whether or not to implement a new 
set of WTO rules, as long as their non-implementation does not significantly impair 
the trade interests of other WTO members.    
Sixth, the developing economies, on their part, need to accept the core discipline 
of WTO on market access, including undertaking liberalization commitments. This 
may, however, be done in a differentiated manner across the entire spectrum of 
developing economies.    
Seventh, the multilateral trade system needs to explore feasible channels for 
meeting the special institutional development needs of low-income developing 
economies and LDCs.  
Eighth, the industrial economies need to meet the trade-related technical 
assistance needs of the small and low-income developing economies.
11   
None of the above proposals are novel and revolutionary; these or similar 
expansion of SDT have been discussed in the past. However, if they are deliberated, 
promoted and adopted during the Doha Round, the final outcome would indeed be 
supportive of development in the small and low-income developing economies and 
the LDCs. The name DDA would then ring true.    Dilip K. Das 
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6. Erosion of Non-reciprocal Preferences     
s mentioned earlier, a large number of developing economies are eligible to 
receive benefits from one GSP schedule or the other. These developing 
economies, particularly WTO members from the ACP group and LDCs, have an 
additional concern about the erosion of non-reciprocal trade preferences during the 
Doha Round. As the industrial economies slash their tariffs on imports from all of 
their trading partners under MFN-based multilateral trade liberalization, the value of 
trade preferences previously granted to these country groups will erode decisively, 
adversely affecting the competitiveness of their exports.
12 To that extent, these small 
and low-income developing countries believe that the MTNs render them vulnerable. 
To be sure, loss due to preference erosion – which will drive down competitiveness 
enjoyed exclusively due to the GSP – will be partly offset by expanding multilateral 
market size and higher world prices. However, some of these economies fear serious 
loss of their export markets and expect setbacks in their export revenues. They have 
become indifferent to general MFN trade liberalization by lowering tariffs and 
elimination of quotas and have begun resisting and resenting the MFNs. This conflict 
has pitted a small number of low-income and some medium-income economies 
against the interests of the other developing economies.   
It was pointed out in the preceding section that, first, not all the developing 
countries have gained a lot from the GSP schemes that were devised for them. Second, 
the high degree of apprehension related to preference erosion due to MFN-based 
liberalization is not supported by empirical research. A comprehensive study of the 
non-reciprocal preference–recipient countries inferred that these countries as a group 
did not lose from preference erosion following MFN-based trade liberalization in the 
Doha Round, although significant gains and losses underlie the estimates of the 
average (Low and Piermartini, 2005). Low and Piermartini’s research (using a Swiss 
formula, with a coefficient of 10) showed that the beneficiaries of GSP schemes of the 
Quad countries plus Australia enjoy a net gain of $2 billion in terms of the value of 
adjusted preference margins on non-agricultural products. Almost all LDCs either lose 
from preference erosion, or they are unaffected by it because their exports are MFN 
tariff-free. Their loss was estimated at $170 million, not high by any normal standard. 
However, a significant effect of preference erosion was found for LDCs exporting 
textiles and apparel.                    
Using elaborate cross-country analysis, Alexandraki and Lankes (2004) quantified 
the impact of preference erosion and inferred that it is a source of vulnerability for a 
small set of countries that have enjoyed deep preferential access to the markets of the 
Quad and that have an undiversified export base and a heavy export dependence on 
the Quad markets alone. The ability to absorb the impact of preference erosion will 
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necessarily depend upon an economy’s competitiveness in the affected sectors and 
upon its macroeconomic robustness. Alexandraki and Lankes’s calculations revealed 
that the magnitude of potential shock in a realistic, realizable scenario was small. It 
ranged between 0.5 percent and 1.2 percent of the total exports of the countries for the 
sample countries, and was dependent upon the elasticity of export supply. This small 
impact of preference erosion was also spread over time, in accordance with the 
liberalization schedule established under the Doha Round. Nevertheless, for a small 
subset of economies the shocks of preference erosion could be significant. Estimates 
show that small island countries that enjoyed deep preferences in the Quad markets 
due to historic, cultural or geo-political reasons in the EU (in the case of banana and 
sugar exports) and the United States (in the case of sugar exports) have suffered most 
under the MFN liberalization under the Doha Round.  
7. Conclusions and Summary  
t is a significant fact that the members of the multilateral trade regime presently 
range from very high-income to very low-income countries. This reality of global 
economic life has a bearing on the operations of the multilateral trading system. Given 
the large variation among members in terms of their economic and institutional 
resources, their ability and willingness to incur costs associated with implementation 
of new multilateral trade rules also varies. So does their ability to derive benefit from 
new rules. Over the decades, the traditional approach of the developing economies, 
which were at lower income levels, has been to seek benefits from the industrial 
economies under SDT. This was a part of the process of evolution of the multilateral 
trade regime.  
The concept of SDT grew in three basic stages. In the first stages SDT was limited 
to the provisions of Article XVIII of the GATT-1947, which allowed developing 
economies to void or renegotiate their commitments. The second defining moment in 
SDT came during the Kennedy Round, when Part IV on the benefits to and obligations 
of the developing economies was introduced in the Articles of Agreement of the 
GATT-1947. The third important period in the life of SDT came during the Tokyo 
Round. What SDT entails was further clarified and made a formal element of the 
multilateral trading system in 1979, when the Enabling Clause was introduced. 
SDT has operated for the developing economies, principally for the small, low-
income ones, for many decades. Non-reciprocal trade preferences became a part of the 
relationship between the developing and industrial economies in the multilateral trade 
regime. In the recent period such preferences have deepened, particularly for the 
LDCs and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) economies. Theoretically this 
concept is meaningful and significant, but in reality it has not engendered substantial 
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benefits to the beneficiary developing economies. Empirical research on this issue 
concluded that not many developing countries have benefited from SDT. There are 
several reasons for this failure. The beneficiaries of SDT, particularly WTO members 
from the ACP group and LDCs, have an additional concern, that is, the erosion of non-
reciprocal trade preferences during the Doha Round. Empirical research on preference 
erosion has concluded that apprehension related to erosion from MFN liberalization is 
over-stated.  
As sovereign countries, a large number of small and low-income developing 
economies and LDCs are now members of the WTO. As their number grew, this 
category of countries acquired a good deal of influence in the multilateral trade system 
and its decision-making process. During the Fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancún, 
and the subsequent WTO meeting in Geneva in July 2004, this subgroup of small 
developing countries held together as the Group-of-Ninety (G-90). This subgroup 
presently dominates the WTO system – even though they are small trading economies. 
The new systemic reality of the multilateral trade regime is diametrically opposite to 
that of the early decades of the GATT system. The evolving multilateral trade regime 
will need to adapt to the expectations and needs of this country group. 
It is widely recognized that small and low-income developing countries stand to 
gain in the long term from trade liberalization and integration into the multilateral 
trade regime. There are short-term macroeconomic adjustments, which in turn lead to 
immediate adjustment costs. However, the short-term macroeconomic adjustment 
costs are small relative to the long-term efficiency gains. 
Subsequent rounds of MTNs (the Uruguay and Doha Rounds) have reaffirmed 
faith in SDT. The DDA was clear about reaffirming the importance of SDT to the 
multilateral trade regime and referred to it as “an integral part of the WTO 
agreement”. As it has not spawned large benefits for the target groups, there is a 
pressing need to refine the concept of SDT. Academics and policy makers have 
debated over what future shape SDT should take that would enable it to meet its goals. 
A comprehensive set of recommendations has been presented for this purpose.  
The small and low-income developing economies need appropriate policy space 
to accommodate their requirements. They need greater flexibility in trade policy 
implementation, and they need to be able to pursue policies that would otherwise be 
subject to strict multilateral discipline. It is prudent to give small and low-income 
developing countries a choice in the implementation of a specific set of new trade 
regulations, as long as this measure does not impose significant negative spillovers on 
other members. 
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1.   In 2006, the United Nations classification of LDCs included 50 countries, of          
which 30 are members of the WTO and 5 are observers. 
2.   In discussions of international trade, the two expressions the GATT-1947 and the 
GATT-1994 are frequently used. The latter is the revised version of the original 
GATT Agreement of 1947. The text of the agreement was significantly revised 
and amended during the Uruguay Round, and the new version was agreed upon in 
Marrakesh, Morocco. Apparently, the GATT-1994 reflected the outcome of 
negotiations on issues relating to the interpretations of specific articles. In its 
renewed version, the GATT-1994 includes specific understandings with respect to 
GATT articles, its obligations and provisions, plus the Marrakesh Protocol of the 
GATT-1994. 
3.   Although most-favored nation sounds like a contradiction, implying some kind of 
special treatment to a particular trade partner, in WTO jargon it means non-
discrimination, that is, treating all trade partners under the WTO regime equally. 
Each WTO member treats every other member as its “most-favoured” trading 
partner. If any country improves the market benefits to one trading partner, it is 
obliged to give the same best treatment to all other WTO members, so that they all 
remain “most-favoured”. However, historically MFN did not mean equal 
treatment.      
4.   For instance, the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), the Lome Convention, the 
Cotonou Agreement, the NAFTA Parity Act, the Central American Common 
Market (CACM) and the CARICOM Common Market are some of the PTAs that 
were created under the Enabling Clause.    
5.   The developing economies, according to the World Bank (2006) definition, are 
divided into various subgroups. These subgroupings are available in Classification 
of Economies on the Internet at 
http://www.worldbank.org/data/countryclass/countryclass.html. Economies are 
classed according to 2003 per capita gross national income. The groups are as 
follows: low-income developing countries, $765 or less; lower-middle income, 
$766 - $3,035; upper-middle income, $3,036 - $9,385; and high income, $9,386 or 
more.  
6.   The definition of absolute poor is based on subsistence, the minimum standard 
needed to live. Robert McNamara, who coined this term, defined it as “a condition 
of life beneath any reasonable standard of human dignity.” There has been a long 
drawn debate in the discipline regarding whether income or consumption poverty 
lines should be defined in absolute or relative terms. Most international 
organizations define the poverty line in an absolute way as the “level of income 
necessary for people to buy the goods necessary to their survival.” In keeping with 
this concept, the dollar-a-day line, at 1985 purchasing power parity, is extensively 
used in academic research and by policy makers (Bourgignon, 1999). However, a 
broader definition of poverty would be the general lack of the capabilities that 
would enable a person to live a life he or she values; such a definition would 
encompass such domains as income, health, education, empowerment and human 
rights.  
7.   See for instance Brenton (2003) and Brenton and Manchin (2002).    Dilip K. Das 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy    56
                                                                                                                                            
8.   See Das (2004) for these details, in particular chapter 3, as well as Schiff and 
Winters (2003). 
9.   Canada, the European Union, Japan and the United States are the four 
Quadrilateral countries. 
10.  Some recent studies are those by Oyejide (2002), Hart and Dymond (2003), 
Hoekman, Michalopoulous and Olarreaga (2003), Hoekman, Michalopoulous and 
Winters (2003), Hoekman et al (2003), Hoekman, Michalopoulous and Winters 
(2004) and Hoekman (2005). These recommendations on SDT have been drawn 
from the studies enumerated here.  
11.  Ibid.  
12.  Several researchers have addressed these issues. See for instance Hoekman, 
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